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STATUS OF UNRECORDED LIENS IN BANKRUPTCY
THE STATUS OF UNRECORDED LIENS IN
BANKRUPTCY.
One of the questions which frequently occurs in the present
rising tide of bankruptcy cases is that of the relation of state
recording statutes to the bankruptcy law. The point more fre-
quently arises with reference to personal property and the
rights of the holder of a chattel mortgage or conditional sale
contract under any of the multiple forms which such instru-
ments modernly take.
Under Section 70 of the Law of 189S the title to all property
(substantially speaking) of the bankrupt passes to the trus-
tee. In addition to this the trustee acquires any rights which
could have been exercised by a general creditor had bank-
ruptcy not intervened, and to that category the right of
jection to the validity of mortgages and liens asserted against
any of the property of the bankrupt estate is referable. This
right of subrogation, or, it might even more frankly be called
appropriation, has application to liens which are void under
any state law in the same degree as it does to liens which are
voided by the bankruptcy law itself. Very soon after the
passage of the bankruptcy law the courts began to experience
difficulty in the application of these fundamental principles.
Of course, there is a clear right, and the trustee is possessed
of the undoubted standing to enforce this right, where the
facts of the case satisfy the conditions of a voidable prefer-
ence under the bankruptcy law. But where the position of the
trustee is dependent upon the authority of a state statute
of fraudulent conveyances or a recording or registering
statute, passed for the benefit of creditors, there arises at once
a procedural difficulty of great perplexity. In many of the
States a distinction is made in the statute law between prior
and subsequent creditors, and in others some form of distinc-
tion or favoritism is indulged along this line in the decided
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cases even where the statute is general in terms. The courts
have generally been disposed to recognize the superior equity
of creditors who have actually been deceived by the appearance
of ownership of property held in possession by their debtor
and upon the faith and credit of which they have placed their
trust. There is a natural sympathy for this class of creditors
reflected in the policy of the law in many jurisdictions in which
creditors not so circumstanced do not share. The trustee who
is the representative of general creditors would be called upon
in such case to function for the benefit of all creditors by seiz-
ing upon the rights of this favored class and administering it
for the partial benefit of another class which of itself had no
right. This manifest contradiction has led to much confusion
in thinking. In some of the States, as in Missouri, an unre-
corded chattel mortgage or conditional contract of sale is
void at the instance of creditors, but in order to raise the
question, which resolves itself into one of priority of liens,
the creditor must have levied his attachment or execution upon
the affected property before the recordation of the instru-
ment. In such cases the question became quite acute as to the
quality of the trustee's title and standing where the debtor
went into bankruptcy with an unrecorded lieu upon his prop-
erty and no process levied by any creditor. In nearly every
case the holder of the lien records it immediately upon hearing
of his debtor's financial debility. Some times the recordation
is effected just prior, and, in many instances, just subsequent,
to bankruptcy. The difficulty is obviated and all procedural
rules satisfied where a levy is existing at the time of bank-
ruptcy, for in such case the trustee merely takes, over the levy,
which has, because of the bankruptcy, become abortive in the
hands of the creditor, and under authority of Section 67 prose-
cutes it for the benefit of the estate.
But in instances where no attachment or levy has been
made prior to bankruptcy, the extent of the right and quality
of title of the trustee was a constantly recurring issue and
one which was decided differently in different jurisdictions.
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Much of this difficulty and inharmony of decision was re-
lieved by the Amendment of 1910 by which the status of a
creditor having a lien levied was arbitrarily given to the trus-
tee. (Sec. 47, Bankruptcy Act Amendment 1910.) It was
largely taken for granted by the bar of the country that it was
the intention of Congress by its amendment to give this status
to the trustee during the four months prior to bankruptby,
which was the period of limitation fixed by Sections 60 and 67,
although the Act was silent upon this phase, and under this
theory of construction the position of the trustee as against
the holders of secret and unrecorded liens was greatly
strengthened. The Supreme Court of the United States de-
cided in due time, however, that the new status of trustees in
bankruptcy related only to the date of bankruptcy and not to
the four months' period preceding.1
It is not of infrequent occurrence that a creditors' meeting
may be called or by some other form of notice the creditors
become aware that bankruptcy of their debtor is a possibility,
and it so happens that those creditors who are holding liens
which through negligence or for other reasons have been with-
held from record, are thus reminded and in a spirit of last
chance activity rush their liens to record. Within a few days
perhaps bankruptcy ensues and the question at once becomes
acute as to whether the recordation of the lien before bank-
ruptcy removes the defect which undoubtedly would have
proven fatal after bankruptcy.
The statute of Missouri makes no difference in classes of
creditors in dealing with the subject of the recordation of
chattel mortgages, but makes them void where unrecorded,
as to everybody. The earlier cases in the courts of appeal of
Missouri hold, however, that before the issue can be raised by
creditors, a lien must have been levied by some creditor before
the mortgage was recorded. Otherwise the recording of the
mortgage validated it before the question of its validity had
1. Bailey v. Baker Ice Mach. Co., 239 U. S. 268.
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been challenged by any proceeding in court. Subsequently,
however, a policy and principle grew up in the decisions of the
courts of appeal in Missouri, whereby this rule of procedure
was relaxed as to. subsequent creditors, for the reason that
they having extended their credit upon faith of the apparent
ownership and title to the property in question, have secured
a right grounded in equity which is superior to that of prior
creditors and which enables such special class of creditors to
oppose the validity of a mortgage, notwithstanding the fact
that it had been recorded before such creditor instituted any
proceeding or levied any lien. This principle seems to be the
settled policy of the law of Missouri and will scarcely admit
of question at this time.
In the case of Stewart v. Asbury,2 Judge Farrington,
speaking for the Springfield Court of Appeals, lays this down
as the undoubted doctrine of the courts of appeal of this
State. After a more than usually thorough consideration of
the authorities upon the subject, he has used this language:
"It has long been the law of this State that a creditor who
extends his credit to his debtor at a time when there is a
chattel mortgage or conditional contract creating a secret
lien on property in the hands of the debtor ostensibly his,
cannot be defeated by the mortgagee or vendor taking posses.
sion thereof under the mortgage or conditional contract, or
filing the same for record."
If, therefore, the creditors of an estate were all subsequent
creditors, there would be no question but that the trustee wha
accedes to their rights would be enabled to successfully con.
tend that a secret lien even where it was recorded prior to
bankruptcy, was void under the law of the State of Mis-
souri.
It was held in the case of Martin v. Commercial Nat'l,
Bank,3 that the trustee must hold the position of some creditors
2. 199 Mo. App., I. c. 126.
3. 246 U. B. 513 (40 A. B. P. 765).
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who would have been in position themselves to actually chal-
lenge the transfer, and in the leading case of Carey v. Dono-
hue,4 that the trustee must be in the position of some person
for whose benefit the state law of registration and recorda-
tion of mortgages was enacted, before he could secure the
operation of the state law for the benefit of an estate in bank-
ruptcy. In the latter case the statute of Ohio there drawn in
question, was made for the benefit of subsequent purchasers.
which is a class of persons having no interest in a bankruptcy
case and not represented by the trustee. The decision in
the Carey case harmonized much confusion existing in the
decisions of various circuits and yet it would seem that this
confusion after all was traceable to the divergent phraseology
of the State statutes under consideration rather than to any
wide difference in principle. It is true that the Eighth Cir-
cult, and probably one or two others, had made the character
of the instrument the test as to whether it was required to be
recorded or not, without regard to the persons in whose favor
such requirement was imposed. To this extent, the Supreme
Court in the Carey case has modified the opinion in the First
National Bank v. Connett,5 and in the Mattley v. Giesler,6
cases, but not in other respects.
Of course, if the trustee can enforce only such rights as
creditors could themselves enforce if bankruptcy had not oc-
curred, then the trustee is limited in cases where a tardy recor-
dation has taken place, to the enforcement of the rights of
subsequent creditors alone. This was the procedure followed
in Missouri, and it naturally follows, for their benefit alone.
This was the procedure followed in re Bothe' which went up
from the Eastern Division of the Eastern District of Missour'i
in which the trustee was allowed to enforce the rights of subse-
quent creditors, for the benefit of subsequent creditors, to the
4. 240 U. S. 430.
5. 142 Fed. 33.
6. 187 Fed. 370.
7. 173 Fed. 697.
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exclusion of others, and the fund affected was ordered distrib-
uted among a particular class composed of subsequent credi-
tors and the lien claimant. General creditors were excluded
from participation.
Since the decision of the In re Bothe case, and since the
decision of the case of Carey v. Donohue above referred to, the
question has again been adverted to, and the proposition here
under consideration has received further illumination from a
decision written by Judge Hook in this, the Eighth Circuit, in
the case of Bunch v. Maloney.' Judge Hook was one of the
judges who assented to the decision in the Bothe case in 1909,
and his decision in a case involving the same question, in 1916,
marks the progress of his thinking and the development of the
law in the meantime. In deciding that the distinction between
prior and subsequent creditors in state practice is a mere rule
of procedure which need not be followed in bankruptcy, lie
us: s the following language:
"The reasonable conclusion is that, where the applicable
registry statute provides generally that an unfiled or unre-
corded transfer shall be void as to 'creditors', or employs
words of similar import, as in Arkansas, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, as the representative of general creditors, may invoke
the remedy of Section 60b, regardless of the local construc-
tion of the statute making a procedural distinction between
creditors with a lien and those without."
This language appeals to us as reasonable. Should one or
more of the prior creditors levy an attachment or execution
prior to the recordation of the mortgages whose validity is
disputed, but within the four months before bankruptcy, such
creditor could not himself pursue his advantage because his
lien would, under Section 67, be void. In such case, however,
the trustee would have the right under Section 6Th to cause
himself to be substituted as party plaintiff and prosecute
such lien to final judgment, and having secured a favorable
8. 233 Fed. 967.
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judgment sustaining the lien as against the subsequently re-
e'orded mortgage, he would take the chattel and administer
it for the benefit of the estate. Indeed, his right of subroga-
tion and substitution entirely depends upon a statute which
permits such right to be exercised only for the benefit of the
estate. Now to limit the scope of the representative capacity
of the trustee to subsequent creditors alone, would amount to
a determination that the title of a trustee to the property of a
bankrupt is derived by inheritance or succession of title rather
than created, defined and limited by the bankruptcy law. The
rights of the trustee do not come by any process of succession
or inheritance from the bankrupt or creditors, but are de-
rived from the provisions of the bankruptcy law which create
those rights, for the benefit of the estate and general cred-
itors whom he is destined to represent and to serve. No rights
are given to the trustee and no title is vested in the trustee
by any provision of the bankruptcy law except with this end
and aim in view, that the estate, which is distributable to the
general unsecured creditors, may be benefited. The right
which the recording statute of Missouri created as against
unrecorded mortgages, is given to all creditors alike, and no
distinction is made between prior and subsequent creditors
in respect of this right. It is true that a procedural distinc-
tion has grown up in the process of the exercise of this sub-
stantive right, which has prevented in many cases prior cred-
itors from exercising the right whereas subsequent creditors
were permitted to exercise it. At the door of bankruptcy, how-
ever, all procedural questions of purely local derivation should
be left behind. The bankruptcy court is the forum; the bank-
ruptcy law provides the procedure, and it remains alone to
inquire what rights the trustee has acquired under the State
law as well as under the bankruptcy law, in the interest and
for the benefit of the bankrupt esiate. The decision of Judge
Hook, from which we have just quoted, amoubts to a con-
struction and application of the Carey v. Donohue opinion
and establishes a rule which is compelling in this circuit. The
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statute of Arkansas under consideration in that case is not
different in principle from the statute of Missouri. This is
the feeling that Judge Van Valkenburgh evidently holds about
the matter for he said, In re Bennett :9
"The subsequent creditor is already armed with all that is
necessary for his protection and the trustee is fully empowered
to preserve and assert his rights for the benefit, not alone of
such subsequent creditors, but through them for the benefit
of the entire estate."
And in the concluding paragraph of that decision, he in-
dulges in this expression:
"Of course, it must follow that in accordance with the
doctrine announced in L A. Becker v. Gill,1o the claim of the
petitioner herein must be allowed as a general claim and that
the fund involved must be distributed ratably among all cred-
itors of the same class."
The Ninth Circuit has apparently swung into line also upon
this proposition, and Judge Hunt, speaking for the Court
in a case coming up from California, endorses the doctrine of
the Bunch case and applies it to the facts under consideration
quite as a matter of course, in the case of Nat'l. Bank v.
Moore.11
In conclusion, two propositions emerge from the foregoing
discussion: First, mortgages in Missouri which are withheld
from record beyond a "reasonable" time and not recorded
until after bankruptcy, are void at the instance of the trustee;
second, such mortgages recorded within four months prior to
bankruptcy and during insolvency are void as to the trustee
even where no action has been initiated by creditors if it can
be shown that any subsequent credit was extended.
J. M. LASHLY.
9. 264 Fed. 537.
10. 206 Fed. 36.
11. 247 Fed. 913.
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